ABSTRACT I n this paper we study a two-period game between a government and a terrorist, where the terrorist decides whether to stockpile attack resources from the first to the second period. Our results show that the terrorist chooses stockpiling when: (a) the following parameters are in intermediate ranges: the government's asset valuation, the terrorist's first-period resource, the government's unit defense cost, and the terrorist's unit attack cost; (b) the terrorist's secondperiod resource is small; and (c) the terrorist's resource growth factor or discount factor is large. We also compare our model with the one that does not allow terrorist stockpiling. For moderate growth factors and secondperiod resources for the terrorist, the terrorist does not prefer the option of stockpiling. The terrorist prefers stockpiling for the more uncommon case that the growth factor for the terrorist's stockpiled resource is very large and the second-period resource is very small. In contrast, the government always prefers that the terrorist has the stockpiling option.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding and defeating terrorist threats over time are important but challenging. In the literature, counterterrorism has been modeled as games between terrorist and government. See Sandler and Siqueira (2009) for a survey of work that examines the strategic interaction between governments and terrorists. However, multiperiod games between terrorist and government have hardly been studied. One exception is Zhuang et al. (2010) , who study secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling and resourceallocation game.
Assessing the terrorist's capacity to attack over time is essential. In particular, the timing of attack(s) and the terrorist's option of stockpiling attack resources are of particular interest. For example, the lack of major terrorist attacks following 9/11 could possibly be explained by terrorists stockpiling resources and preparing for large future attacks. To our knowledge, this interesting and important scenario has not been studied in the literature. To fill this gap, this paper studies a two-period game between a government and a terrorist, where the terrorist decides whether to stockpile attack resources from the first to the second period.
Terrorists generate resources in multiple ways. They sometimes enjoy benefactors who provide funds, and are often engaged in activities that generate funds. Usually, resources become available over time. A strategic decision for the terrorist is when to use its resources. It might use all of its resources as they become available, or accumulate resources in various ways. In this paper we simplify this complex resource-generating situation by assuming that the terrorist gets one resource in the first period, and a second resource in the second period. The terrorist may either use its resources to attack in both periods, or it may accumulate its resource from the first to the second period. We allow the terrorist to earn interest on, or suffer depreciation of, its first-period resource in terms of a growth factor. Whether the terrorist accumulates resources or not impacts how the government designs its defenses in the first and second periods. On the other hand, the government's first-period defense may indeed impact whether or not the terrorist stockpiles its resource. For example, the U.S. implemented vigorous defenses after 9/11, which likely deterred immediate subsequent attacks, possibly inducing potential terrorists to accumulate resources while waiting for governments to relax their defenses over time, which has been a common trend since 9/11. This strategic interaction between the government's defenses in the two periods, and the terrorist's decision of whether or not to accumulate resources from the first to the second period, is the key focus of this paper.
Whereas earlier research has focused on substitutions between multiple assets (Bier et al. , 2008 Enders and Sandler 2003; Hao et al. 2009; Hausken 2006) , this paper confines attention to one asset to focus explicitly on the time dimension. The reason is that the temporal effects (terrorist accumulates resources over time, government allocate resources over time) are much less studied in the literature. One asset is justified when a terrorist bears a grudge against one opponent in general, e.g. the Western World, and is more concerned about whether and when to attack this opponent, rather than about which asset possessed by the defender should be attacked.
Some research has focused on investment substitutions across time. For example, Enders and Sandler (2003) suggest that a terrorist might compile and accumulate resources during times when the government's investments are high, awaiting times when the government might relax his efforts and choose lower investments. Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003: 201, 224) show that ''the optimal control of terror stocks will rely on both ongoing abatement and periodic cleanup'' of ''a terrorist's Ôstock of terror capacity.Õ' ' Enders and Sandler (2005) use time series to show that little has changed in overall terrorism incidents before and after 9/11. Using 9/11 as a break date, they find that logistically complex hostage-taking events have fallen as a proportion of all events, while logistically simple, but deadly, bombings have increased as a proportion of deadly incidents. Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) consider the interaction between preemption and defense. For example, high-cost defenders might rely on preemption, while too little preemption might give rise to subsequent excessive defense. Raczynski (2004) simulates the dynamic interactions between terror and antiterror groups. Feichtinger and Novak (2008) use differential game theory to study the intertemporal strategic interactions of Western governments and terror organizations. They illustrate long-run persistent oscillations. Berman and Gavious (2007) study a leader-follower game in which the State provides counterterrorism support across multiple metropolitan areas to minimize losses, while the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility. Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007 ) consider for 1949 -2004 how terrorists seek targets in Israel, responding to costs and benefits, and find that long periods without an attack signal lower risk for most localities, but higher risk for important areas. Barros et al. (2006) apply parametric and semiparametric hazard model specifications to study durations between Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's (ETA, a Spain-based terrorist group) terrorist attacks, which seem to increase in summer and decrease with respect to, e.g., deterrence and political variables. Udwadia et al. (2006) consider the dynamic behavior of terrorists, those susceptible to terrorist and pacifist propaganda, military/police intervention to reduce the terrorist population, and nonviolent, persuasive intervention to influence those susceptible to becoming pacifists. Hausken (2008) considers a terrorist that defends an asset that grows from the first to the second period. The terrorist seeks to eliminate the asset optimally across the two periods. Telesca and Lovallo (2006) find that a terror event is not independent from the time elapsed since the previous event, except for severe attacks that approach a Poisson process. This latter finding suggests that attack and defense decisions are not unit-periodic in nature, but that there are linkages through time.
One objective of the current paper is to understand more thoroughly the nature of such linkages through time, affected by changes in resources, unit costs of defense and attack, etc. Brown et al. (2006) consider defender-attackerdefender models. First the defender invests in protecting the infrastructure, subject to a budget constraint. Then, a resource-constrained attack is carried out. Finally, the defender operates the residual system as best possible. They exemplify with border control, the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, and electric power grids. Sandler and Siqueira (2009) focus on defensive versus proactive countermeasures, the impact of domestic politics, the interaction between militant and political factions within terrorist groups, and fixed budgets. Azaiez and Bier (2007) consider the optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems. Bier et al. (2005) and Bier and Abhichandani (2002) assume that the defender minimizes the success probability and expected damage of an attack. Bier et al. (2005) analyze the protection of series and parallel systems with components of different values. Levitin (2007) considers the optimal element separation and protection in complex multistate series-parallel system and suggests an algorithm for determining the expected damage caused by a strategic attacker. Patterson and Apostolakis (2007) introduced importance measures for ranking the system elements in complex systems exposed to terrorist actions. Michaud and Apostolakis (2006) analyzed such measures of damage caused by the terror as impact on people, impact on environment, impact on public image, etc. Bier et al. (2006) assume that a defender allocates defense to a collection of locations while an attacker chooses a location to attack. They show that the defender allocates resources in a centralized, rather than decentralized, manner, that the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option. Furthermore, the defender prefers its defense to be public rather than secret. Also, the defender sometimes leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. Dighe et al. (2009) consider secrecy in defensive allocations as a strategy for achieving more cost-effective attacker deterrence. Zhuang and Bier (2011) model secrecy and deception as a signaling and resourceallocation game between a government and a terrorist. Hausken et al. (2009) consider a defender that chooses tradeoffs between investments in protection against natural disaster only, protection against terrorism only, and all-hazards protection, allowing sequential or simultaneous moves. Similarly, Zhuang and Bier (2007) study the balance between natural disaster and terrorism, where either the defender moves first (and the attacker second), or they move simultaneously. Levitin and Hausken (2008) consider a two-period model in which the defender, moving first, distributes its resource between deploying redundant elements and protecting them from attacks.
We show the conditions when the government and terrorist prefer versus do not prefer that the terrorist has the option of stockpiling resources. One example in which an agent prefers to limit its strategy set is Schelling's (1960) modeling of burning one's own bridges in war. A second example is the Battle of Julu in 207 B.C., when General Xiang sank all his ships, ensuring that no one could retreat from battle, and destroyed all his food supply and cooking utensils to ensure that his soldiers would fight to survive . A third example is Capitan Hernando Cortes' 1519 burning of his ships to motivate his men to adapt to his at-all-costs attitude. A fourth example is Ulysses who wanted to hear the Sirens' song, which would render him irrational. He tied himself to the mast to limit his irrationality (Elster 1984 
Assumptions
We assume that the terrorist has an incoming resource R 1 in period 1 and an incoming resource R 2 in period 2. The resource can be converted at unit cost B into an attack effort. If the terrorist does not stockpile, it exerts effort A 1 ¼ R 1 /B in period 1 and A 2 ¼ R 2 /B in period 2. If the terrorist stockpiles, it exerts no effort in period 1 (A 1 ¼ 0) and exerts effort A 2 ¼ (gR 1 1 R 2 )/B in period 2, where g expresses growth on the terrorist's stockpiled resource: g ¼ 1 means no growth, g . 1 means growth (e.g., interest on a bank account), and 0 # g , 1 means resource degradation, which occurs when the terrorist cannot preserve its resource over time, due to the resource getting obsolete, stolen, defection, etc. The government exerts effort d 1 in period 1 and effort d 2 in period 2, both at unit cost b, to protect an asset. For the probability P t of asset damage in period t, we apply the ratio form contest success function (Tullock 1980 
When the terrorist stockpiles, the probability of asset damage in the first period is zero. The probability that the asset is not damaged is 1 2 P t , which the government maximizes, accounting for the asset valuation v, asset defense expenditures bd t , and attack efforts A 1 and A 2 . Conversely, the terrorist maximizes the probability P t of asset damage, valuing the asset at V, and determining whether or not to stockpile. The government's and terrorist's expected utilities over the two periods are
where 0 # d # 1 and 0 # D # 1 are time discount parameters for the government and terrorist, respectively. For simplicity, if the asset is destroyed in the first period, we assume that the asset gets rebuilt before the second period with costs not accounted for in the model. Inserting (2) into (3) gives
The structure of the game shown in Figure 1 is such that the government first decides its first period defense effort d 1 . Thereafter the terrorist determines whether or not to stockpile, which allows the first contest to be conducted. Finally the government determines its second period defense effort d 2 , which allows the second contest to be conducted.
In summary, the game modeled is a twoperson, nonzero sum, two-period game of perfect information. Because of our assumption of compactness of decision domains and continuity of functional forms, a unique subgame perfect 
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Nash equilibrium exists. In the next section we use backward induction to solve the game. We acknowledge that it is documented in the game theory literature that there might exist some Nash equilibria, which could be interesting, which are not subgame perfect. However, subgame perfectness is a nice refinement of Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. In this paper we only focus on subgame perfect equilibrium, which exists, is unique, and is consistent with our sequence of moves.
SOLVING THE MODEL Solving the second period
The game is solved with backward induction starting with the second period. The terrorist's effort in the second period is R/B, where R ¼ R 2 if not stockpiling and R ¼ gR 1 1 R 2 if stockpiling. The government's first-order condition in the second period is
where (x) 1 ¼ max(x,0); that is, replacing negative expression (if any) with zero. Equation (5) states that the government defends in the second period if its valuation divided by its unit cost is larger than the terrorist's second-period resource divided by its unit cost.
Solving the first period
Inserting (5) into (4) gives the players' total utilities as functions of d 1 and A 1 ,
To solve the first period, we distinguish between three cases A, B, and C. Case A has two subcases A1 and A2, case B has three subcases B1, B2, B3, and case C has three subcases C1, C2, C3, for a total of eight cases.
Case A: v # bR 2 /B: In this case, the terrorist prefers stockpiling if and only if
ÁV # ÁV, which is impossible. This implies that the terrorist always prefers not to stockpile (A 1 ¼ R 1 /B; A 2 ¼ R 2 /B) when the second-period
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income R 2 alone is sufficiently large to deter government defense. Differentiating the defender's utility in (6) with respect to d 1 gives
where ''['' means ''defined to be'' for defining notations. The superscript * means optimal value throughout the paper. The variables d Case B: bR 2 /B , v #b(gR 1 1 R 2 )/B: In this case, the terrorist prefers stockpiling (A 1 ¼ 0 and
The defender's utility is
As shown in Appendix A, we have three optimum candidates labeled B1, B2, and B3: These are d
in (9)) and d (9)), which is feasible if and only if Bv . bR 1 . Note also that u B1 # u B3 . The true optimal d Ã 1 is calculated by comparing the utility levels in (9), that is
is calculated using (9) as shown in Appendix A. The terrorist attack choices are determined by (8) 
, the terrorist is indifferent between stockpiling and not stockpiling and we assume that it stockpiles.
, we must have the first line of (9) and therefore the terrorist does not stockpile (A 1 ¼ R 1 /B and A 2 ¼ R 2 /B) according to (8) . The utilities u and U follow from (6).
Case C: n $ b( gR 1 1 R 2 )/B: In this case, the terrorist prefers stockpiling (A 1 ¼ 0 and
As shown in Appendix B, we have three optimum candidates labeled C1, C2, and C3. These are
, which is feasible if and only if Bn . bR 1 . Note also that u C1 # u C3 . Again the true optimal d Ã 1 is calculated by comparing the utility levels in (9), that is Summarizing the equilibrium solution for the eight cases A1, A2, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, and C3 Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium solution for the eight cases. The six variables have the same solution for cases B1 and C1, in which the government is inferior and refrains from defending in the first period (d 1 ¼ 0). The terrorist exploits this by attacking in the first period (A 1 ¼ R 1 /B), which means not stockpiling. The six variables also have the same solution for cases B3 and C3. The terrorist does not stockpile, and the government defends in both periods because its valuation divided by its unit cost exceeds the terrorist's resource (in both periods) divided by its unit cost. For case B2, where the asset valuation is moderate, the government deters the terrorist in the first period, leading the terrorist to stockpile; while in the second period, the government gives up because the cost of defending against the accumulated attack is too large. For case C2, where the asset valuation is high, the government deters the government in the first period, leading the terrorist to stockpile, while still competing with the terrorist in the second period. In summary, the government does not defend in any period for case A1, defends only in period 2 for cases B1 and C1, defends only in period 1 for cases A2 and B2, and defends in both periods for cases B3, C2, and C3. The terrorist stockpiles only in cases B2 and C2.
NUMERICAL TESTING OF THE MODEL
We consider the baseline values
which gives case B2 with stockpiling. Case B2 is especially detrimental for the government, which gets outmaneuvered in period 2 (d 2 ¼ 0) by the terrorist's stockpiling. Because case B2 in (10) and case C2 in (13) cannot be easily solved, we illustrate typical ranges of parameter values where stockpiling occurs to gain intuitive understanding. In particular, the next two subsections conduct one-way and two-way sensitivity analysis respectively.
One-way sensitivity analysis When v is low, it is not worthwhile for the government to defend (case A1). As v increases, the government does not defend against the first attack, but defends against the second attack (case B1). As v increases further, the government turns this upside down by defending in period 1, inducing the terrorist to stockpile (case B2), while not being able to defend against the large second attack. Observe the sharp drop in the terrorist's utility U from case B1 to case B2 (v ¼ 0.9). Further increase of v induces the government to defend in both periods, while the terrorist still stockpiles (case C2). The final increase of v induces the terrorist not to stockpile (case C3). The terrorist enjoys a utility increase in the transition from case C2 to case C3 (v ¼ 1.4). The government's utility is always continuously increasing in v.
Figure 2(b) shows the sensitivity relative to the terrorist's first period resource R 1 . Case C3 occurs when 0 # R 1 # 0.7, Cases C2 and B2 (stockpiling) occur when 0.7 # R 1 # 0.9 and 0.9 # R 1 # 1.2, respectively. Case B1 occurs when R 1 $ 1.2. Cases A1 or A2 never occur because the condition for case A, v # bR 2 B , does not depend on R 1 , and does not hold under baseline parameter values. Observe the low terrorist's utility for cases B2 and C2, as predicted earlier.
Figure 2(c) shows the sensitivity relative to the terrorist's second period resource R 2 . Case A2 occurs when 1 # R 2 , case B occurs when 0 # R 2 , 1. For case B, case B2 occurs when 0 # R 2 # 0.1 and case B1 occurs when 0.1 # R 2 # 1. Figure 3(a) shows the sensitivity relative to the terrorist's resources in periods 1 and 2. We have case A1 for R 1 $ R 2 $ 1. We have case A2 when 1 # R 2 $ R 1 . Given R 2 , 1, we have case C when gR 1 1 R 2 , 1 and case B otherwise. We find the terrorist stockpiling (cases C2 and B2) when R 1 is large and R 2 is small. Figure  3(b) shows the sensitivity relative to the government's utility defense cost vs. the terrorist's unit attack cost. We observe that only the ratio (B/b) maters when determining the cases. In particular, when B/b increases, we have cases 
Two-way sensitivity analysis
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A, B1, B2, C2, and C3, sequentially. We find the terrorist stockpiling (cases B2 and C2) when the ratio B/b is intermediate. Figure 3(c) shows the sensitivity relative to the government's asset valuation v and the growth factor g. We have case A regardless of the value g when v is smaller than 0.1 due to the condition v # bR 2 B . When have case B1 regardless of the value g when v is between 0.1 and 0.9. We find the terrorist stockpiling (cases B2 and C2) when v . 0.9 and 0.4(v -0.9) , ( g -0.8). Figure  3(d) shows the sensitivity relative to the government's discount factor vs. the terrorist's discount factor. There are only two cases B1 and B2, where B2 (stockpiling) is possible when the government's discount factor is small or the terrorist's discount factor is high.
COMPARING WITH THE MODEL WHEN THE TERRORIST IS NOT ALLOWED TO STOCKPILE
In this section we compare our model that allows stockpiling with the one when the terrorist is not allowed to stockpile. The solution for the latter model is a shortened version of Table 1 Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis for the eight parameters relative to the baseline.
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after removing the columns of cases B2 and C2. We have thus not included a new 
which restricts the government's strategy set.
For the case where B2 was optimal when stockpiling was feasible, there are two cases: 1. Bn # bR 1 . From (A5) in Appendix A we must have
Therefore, transitioning from allowing stockpiling to not allowing stockpiling: (a) the government's optimal decision in the first period will transition from d 1B2 * to d 1B1 *; and the utility will decrease from v2b 
The terrorist does not prefer stockpiling when (16) is satisfied. It may sound counterintuitive that the terrorist may prefer not to have the option of stockpiling. This result follows because the terrorist is the second mover. The second mover may not necessarily prefer to have more options. Many options for the second mover constitute a threat that might lead the first mover to make choices that are detrimental to the second mover. If the second mover's options are limited, the first mover may take this limitation into account and make choices that are less detrimental to the second mover. 2. Bn . bR 1 . From (A5) in Appendix A we must have
Therefore, transitioning from allowing stockpiling to not allowing stockpiling: (a) the government's optimal decision in the first period will transition from d 1B2 * to d 1B3 *; and the utility will
; and (b) the terrorist's utility will transition from ÁV
Hence the terrorist prefers stockpiling if and only if
Summing up, the government prefers stockpiling when (17) and
The terrorist prefers stockpiling when (19) and (18) are satisfied. Observe that 
In order for the range in (21) to have positive extension, which is the only way in which the terrorist could prefer stockpiling, we must have
Comparing for case C For case C, v $ bðgR 1 1 R 2 Þ B , if the terrorist is not allowed to stockpile, (13) simplifies to
which restricts the government's strategy set. For the case where C2 was optimal when stockpiling was feasible, there are two cases:
Therefore, transitioning from allowing stockpiling to not allowing stockpiling: (a) the government's optimal decision in the first period will transition from d 1C2 * to d 1C1 *; and the utility will decrease
and (b) the terrorist's utility will change from
Summing up, the government prefers stockpiling when (24) and
The terrorist prefers stockpiling if (24), (25) and
2. Bn . bR 1 . From (B4) in Appendix B we must have
Therefore, transitioning from allowing stockpiling to not allowing stockpiling: (a) DEFENDING AGAINST A TERRORIST WHO ACCUMULATES RESOURCES the government's optimal decision in the first period will transition from d 1C2 * to d 1C3 *; and the utility will decrease from
; and (b) the terrorist's utility will transition from ÁV ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi
which is equivalent to (22). Summing up, the government prefers stockpiling when (27) and
The terrorist prefers stockpiling when (29) and (28) are satisfied.
One-way sensitivity analysis Figure 4 replicates Figure 2 when the terrorist is not allowed to stockpile. Observe that for all the ranges where the terrorist uses stockpiling in Figure 2 , the terrorist's and government's utilities in Figure 4 are higher and lower, respectively, than those in Figure 2 . In other words, with our baseline parameter values, the terrorist does not benefit from the option of stockpiling, while the government benefits from stockpiling. In Appendix C we provide another example with less realistic parameter values (high growth factor g and extremely low second period resource R 2 ), where the terrorist could benefit from the option of stockpiling.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we study a two-period game in which the terrorist decides whether to stockpile attack resources from the first to the second period. In the first period the government decides its first period defense effort followed by the terrorist determining whether or not to stockpile. In the second period the government determines its second period defense effort.
We first assume that stockpiling is an option for the terrorist. That option influences the government's first period defense. Our results show that the terrorist chooses stockpiling when: (a) the following parameters are in intermediate ranges: the government's asset valuation, the terrorist's first-period resource, the government's unit defense cost, and the terrorist's unit attack cost; (b) the terrorist's second-period resource is small; and (c) the terrorist's resource growth factor or discount factor. The terrorist's decision does not depend on the government's discount factor.
We secondly compare with the model where the terrorist is not allowed to stockpile. It turns out that for moderate growth factors and second-period resources for the terrorist, the terrorist does not prefer the option of stockpiling. We show that when the growth factor, from the first to the second period, for the terrorist's stockpiled resource is very large, and the terrorist's second-period resource is very small, then it is possible for the terrorist to prefer stockpiling. Similar cases in which a player prefers to restrict its strategy set are found in warfare (e.g. burning one's bridges or destroying one's resources). In contrast, our analysis shows that for all cases in which stockpiling happens at equilibrium, not allowing stockpiling would decrease the government's utility. This implies that the government always prefers that the terrorist has the stockpiling option. It might sound counterintuitive that the terrorist might prefer not to have the option of stockpiling, which follows because the terrorist is the second mover. Many options for the second mover constitute a threat that might lead the first mover to make choices that are detrimental to the second mover, and conversely when the second mover has fewer options.
Finally, we acknowledge that, like many other academic papers in the field of operations DEFENDING AGAINST A TERRORIST WHO ACCUMULATES RESOURCES research, the parameter values in this paper might be challenging to quantify in practice. Such theoretical papers might provide building blocks and insights for future practical work. We believe that the parameters in this paper (resource, unit costs, asset valuation, etc.) do have real-world counterparts. We propose two methods for future research to handle the quantification challenge. First, the parameters most challenging to quantify can be defined as a fuzzy variables and fuzzy logic model can be studied. Second, the range of possible variation of the parameters that are challenging to quantify can be determined and the most conservative ''worst case'' government's strategy can be obtained under the assumption that the parameters take the values that are most favorable for the terrorist. These parameters can be considered as additional strategic variables that the terrorist can choose within the specified ranges.
NOTES
a The authors have looked at the zero-sum game, corresponding to (4), where bd 1 and bd 2 are included as positive terms for the terrorist, and d¼D. The solutions d 1 and d 2 are the same as when (4) is applied, and the same eight subcases arise for when the terrorist prefers to stockpile, and for ranges of parameter values that are qualitatively similar to the ranges determined in this paper. 
DEFENDING AGAINST A TERRORIST WHO ACCUMULATES RESOURCES
APPENDIX A: CASE B IN SECTION 3
For the second line in (9), we have the corner
, which is strictly positive. For the first line in (9), differentiating with respect to d 1 gives
which is feasible if and only if Bn . bR 1 ). In summary, we have three possible candidates of d
in (9)), and d (9)), and the true optimal d Ã 1 is calculated by comparing the utility levels in (9), which gives (10). Inserting d
into either the first or the second line in (9) gives
Note that we always have uðd
Þ, when both feasible. Therefore, we have:
APPENDIX B: CASE C IN SECTION 3
Similar to our analysis in Case B, we have three candidates of d
, and 
and Bn # bR 1 ) ; or Bn . bR 1 ; and n 2 b 
APPENDIX C: CONSIDERING THE CASE WHEN THE TERRORIST PREFERS STOCKPILING
We define case D as a subcase of case B2 where (18) and (19) are satisfied. We define case E as a subcase of case C2 where (24) and (25), or (28) and (29), are satisfied. Finding parameter values where the terrorist prefers stockpiling is not easy, but Figure 5 shows an example of such cases (D and E) where we keep the same parameter values as earlier, i.e.
, except increasing g with 10% to g ¼ 1.1, and decreasing R 2 with a factor 100 to R 2 ¼ 0.001. This means that the terrorist has virtually no resource in the second period, and enjoys growth on its first period resource. Cases D and E occur in panels a, b, d, e, not embracing the baseline value of each parameter. In Figure 5 (a), D and E occur for n strictly larger than 1. In Figure 5 (b), D and E occur for R 1 strictly lower than 1. In Figure 5 (d), D and E occur for b strictly lower than 1. In Figure 5 (e), D and E occur for B strictly larger than 1. Cases D and E do not occur when we vary the other four parameter values. 
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